China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Amid global supply chain disruptions and rising geopolitical uncertainties, the BRICS cooperation mechanism has become increasingly vital as a platform for promoting economic and trade collaboration among Global South nations, government and business representatives said at a forum on Friday.

BRICS serves as a crucial platform for cooperation among emerging markets and developing countries, as well as a key force in advancing multipolarization and economic globalization, Li Qingshuang, vice-chairperson of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, told the BRICS Economic and Trade Forum in Beijing.

"Currently, the international landscape is marked by increasing volatility and chaos, with rising unilateralism and protectionism," Li said. "The BRICS nations are becoming a key force in stabilizing the global economy and expanding international market space."

BRICS countries account for about 30 percent of the global economy, one-fifth of the world trade volume, and contribute more than half of global economic growth, Li said. "The BRICS nations have effectively broadened the global market and injected certainty and positive energy into the recovery of the world economy."

BRICS is also an important pillar for the Global South to strengthen economic and trade ties, expand development space, and enhance institutional influence, Li emphasized. "The business communities of BRICS nations should uphold true multilateralism, firmly support the multilateral trading system, advance trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and ensure the security, stability and smooth flow of industrial and supply chains."

The forum, themed "BRICS Cooperation Empowering Global South Development: Co-building Standards, Integrating Trade, and Sharing Development", offered a platform for officials and business leaders from BRICS nations to discuss how standardization cooperation can facilitate trade and expand South-South economic ties.

Irene M. Han, deputy ambassador of Indonesia to China, stressed the need to strengthen trade through standard harmonization. "Trade is not only about volume, but it's also about accessibility. Standard certification and regulatory alignment play a very crucial role in enabling products from developing countries to enter global markets," she said.

"In this regard, we support the initiative to build mutual recognition of standards and enhance transparency in trade procedures," she said.

Through better connectivity under BRICS, member nations can build a large market to enable the development of the Global South, she added.

'Practical platform'

Khaled Melad Rezek, minister plenipotentiary and head of the economic and commercial department at the Egyptian embassy in China, said that practical cooperation among emerging economies has become more important than ever. Egypt considers BRICS "not simply as a political or diplomatic forum, but as a practical platform for advancing trade, investment, industrial cooperation, financial collaboration, and more resilient development", he said.

"We see in this grouping a real opportunity to promote stronger South-South cooperation and more diversified engines of development."

Atul Dalakoti, executive director of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry China, said, "BRICS plays an important role in bringing the countries of the Global South together and having their voice heard", citing the expansion of the cooperation mechanism as an example of its growing significance.

Dalakoti noted that discussions are currently underway within BRICS regarding trade liberalization among member countries and trading in local currencies. Such efforts will help create better cooperation among the Global South, he said.

The forum also saw the release of the Handbook on BRICS Trade Development and Standards Cooperation.

"The publication of the handbook serves to lower technical barriers to trade among BRICS nations. By clarifying product standards, certification procedures, and regulatory frameworks, the handbook generally aims to make cross-border trade smoother and more cost-effective for businesses," said Nikolay Gudkov, chief representative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation.

"The handbook is a practical tool to move BRICS cooperation from political agreements to on-the-ground economic reality," he added.

Hosted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the forum drew more than 200 participants, including representatives from Chinese and foreign standardization organizations, business associations, corporate leaders, and diplomats from relevant countries.
yangran1@chinadaily.com.cn

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Since the second half of the 1990s, the “struggle for a multipolar world” has been a central pillar of Russia’s foreign policy. This notion has been repeatedly reiterated ever since. Yet, in reality, this “struggle” has already been won. The multipolar world is already a fact—and has been for more than a decade. Its emergence signifies that the era of unipolarity—when U.S. hegemony went largely unchallenged—has come to an end. The poles of this “new world” have taken shape. At the global level, these include a China, that “has risen,” a Russia that has restored its sovereignty, a rapidly growing India, and—perhaps—a Europe that has recently become more active. At the regional level, several states across the world play similar roles: Brazil in Latin America, Turkey and Iran in the Middle East, Indonesia in Southeast Asia, and South Africa in Africa.

Thus, the world is already multipolar; the key question now concerns the order within this world. It is precisely over this issue that a fierce struggle is unfolding—effectively a functional equivalent of a world war. Under Donald Trump, the United States shifted from the image of a benevolent hegemon and liberal globalist to that of a hardline “master” of the world, acting at its own discretion and from a position of brute force. In an effort not necessarily to restore full hegemony, but at least to salvage its slipping primacy, Washington has launched a broad counteroffensive directed simultaneously at allies (Europe), adversaries (Russia, Iran, China), as well as a number of “rogue” states (such as Venezuela and Cuba).

A World War analogy can even be extended here. The First and Second World Wars of the twentieth century contributed enormously to the growth of America’s economic, political, and military power. The Cold War (an unrealized Third World War) established the United States as the dominant power across the capitalist world, while the collapse of the Soviet Union paved the way to the United States’ unchallenged global hegemony. However, America reached the peak of its power relatively quickly—already at the turn of the century. Today, Pax Americana is clearly entering a period of decline, and this decline is far from peaceful.

The notion that the shift in the world order is an objective process is only partially true. The objective nature of these changes does not preclude the subjective desire of the retreating hegemon to turn the tide in its favor. The American ruling elite is resisting tenaciously and ruthlessly—toward both rivals and allies alike. Ceding primacy and settling for second place, letting China take the lead, is inconceivable for the U.S. Ahead lies a prolonged confrontation—a “long war” involving most, if not all, major powers, as well as many middle and smaller states. In many ways, it resembles a kind of Twenty-First Century Thirty Years’ War.

Multipolarity in the contemporary world is something of a mixed bag. In the contest over the future world order, two key actors stand out: the United States and China. Washington’s actions are directed both at bolstering its own position and at maximally weakening its greatest rival. Covert operations by the CIA and the U.S. Department of Defense in Venezuela, two U.S. wars against Iran, the economic weakening of Europe, attempts by Donald Trump to “take over” Greenland and to strike a deal with Moscow—all of this, at the end of the day, is aimed at denying Beijing access to resources and markets, as well as isolating it politically by undermining the strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and Russia.

Hostile actions, however, tend to provoke resistance from opponents, and it is unlikely that the Americans will be able to reverse prevailing trends in a way that sidelines its rivals, as happened with the British Empire, the German Reich, and the Soviet Union. The defining feature of Trump’s foreign policy—its cynical frankness—erodes the disingenuous yet appealing, image of a “benevolent” America, cast as protector and benefactor, that was forged at the end of the World War II and cultivated over subsequent decades. Today, not only Russians, Chinese, and Iranians, but also Indians, Arabs, Europeans, Japanese, Latin Americans, and many others increasingly perceive the United States as self-interested, unpredictable, and often hostile. As a result, the system of U.S. alliances—one of Washington’s most valuable foreign policy assets—has begun to wobble.
It would, of course, be a mistake to go to the opposite extreme and assume that America’s days at the top of the world are numbered. The United States still possesses formidable financial, technological, and military resources, and is likely to retain its status as a superpower for decades to come. Moreover, it will have no successor as a global hegemon: Pax Americana will not give way to Pax Sinica. Even if Beijing succeeds in pulling ahead in advanced technologies and in constructing a comprehensive system of international trade centered on China, this alone will not suffice for global leadership.

In fact, the notion of leadership is largely absent from Chinese foreign policy philosophy and practice. The global initiatives put forward by Xi Jinping—including those in the realm of global governance—reflect a vision of a future world united by a shared destiny and guided by the principles of multilateralism and inclusive participation by all states. China’s initial conception of the future world order was clearly globalist and reformist in nature. Russian proposals, and especially Beijing’s actions in recent years, have been labeled as “revolutionary,” which, coming from Chinese communists, was by no means intended as a compliment. Practice, however, remains the ultimate test of truth.

In contemporary Chinese ideology, the emphasis on multipolarity has largely receded: the issue is considered settled. Instead, China advances a set of principles, norms, and rules for global coexistence. These principles are broadly consonant with Russian approaches. Naturally, it follows that the world’s leading economy—today in terms of GDP measured at purchasing power parity, and tomorrow in absolute terms—will rightfully claim a central—or, if one prefers, a pivotal—role in the future international order, thereby justifying its self-designation.

Thus, one possible scenario for the new world order could be a new—this time U.S.-China—bipolarity. Many countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, are already preparing for this scenario by balancing between the two giants. They are economically tied to China through trade, while maintaining close political and military ties with the United States. Such an intermediate, “hedging” position is inherently unstable and is unlikely to withstand the test of a serious crisis in U.S.-China relations, the likelihood of which is growing.

An acute crisis, provided the parties are able to emerge from it and establish a relatively stable equilibrium, could lead—if not to the formation of opposing blocs as in the Cold War—then at least to mutually recognized spheres of influence among the superpowers. A similar outcome is already being driven by the competition between technological platforms, in which the United States and China are the main players, far ahead of the rest of the world.

Hypothetically, a new bipolarity might be accepted—albeit reluctantly—by the United States, in the hope that such a “draw” would eventually pave the way for victory, as it did in the U.S.–Soviet rivalry. It could also be seen as an acceptable interim outcome in China, which traditionally “plays the long game.” However, such an arrangement is unlikely to be seen as desirable by other countries, especially major powers such as Russia and India, and possibly Europe as well.

More importantly, in the first half of the twenty-first century—unlike in the latter half of the twentieth—Washington is unlikely to prioritize the interests of its global empire or risk the very existence of the United States to defend distant “imperial peripheries.” Trump is not an aberration, but a concentrated expression of a broader trend: great-power nationalism is displacing global imperialism within the United States. Thus, “America First” effectively amounts to “Home Alone.”

Even if a new, full-scale bipolarity does not materialize, the United States and China will remain as the world’s two leading powers for some time to come. There will be no sharp bloc division, but spheres of influence will form around Washington and Beijing. This poses a clear challenge for states seeking to uphold their sovereignty and strategic autonomy, including Russia.

Russian foreign policy philosophy and tradition gravitate toward the concept of a concert of great powers as the optimal model of global governance. The Holy Alliance, established at the Congress of Vienna, the meetings of the Big Three in 1943–1945, and the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, as well as the “P5” of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which, under the United Nations Charter, bear “primary responsibility” for the maintenance of international peace and security, serve for as examples of equal cooperation among the major powers—necessarily including Russia—on the basis of mutual recognition and consideration of each other’s interests.

At the current stage of development, this “concert” model has taken the form of a community of civilizations. Russia has officially proclaimed itself a “civilization-state.” A civilization-state is understood as a fully-fledged, sovereign manifestation of humanity. Russian authors typically identify China, India, and the United States as other civilization-states. At present, this constitutes a complete list of great powers. Other major civilizations—Islamic, African, and Latin American—span multiple states and do not have a single universally recognized representative.

In the Russian worldview, civilization-states interact by balancing one another, competing and cooperating on the basis of their own interests while adhering to shared values rooted in their traditions. Roles within the international system are distributed accordingly: great powers assume responsibility for maintaining order, while middle and smaller states cooperate and benefit from that order. In principle, such a model could be implemented within a fundamentally reformed United Nations—one that is more representative in civilizational terms at the level of the Security Council and whose institutional apparatus is no longer dominated by representatives of Western countries.
Some elements of the future world order are already being implemented and tested within organizations and forums of the Global Majority, established with Russia playing a leading role. At the global level, this is BRICS; at the continental Eurasian level, it is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Unlike Western formats such as the G7 and NATO, these frameworks do not have a hegemon—despite China’s obvious economic power or Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
Within frameworks such as BRICS, the SCO, as well as the EAEU and CSTO, principles of international security proposed by Russia and Belarus for the foundation of a Eurasian security architecture are being put to the test. These include the indivisibility of the security of the system’s members, respect for sovereignty, and recognition of the diversity of development models and political systems, among others. Admittedly, the road from declarations to reality, ideology to implementation, is a difficult one. In 2025, SCO members India and Pakistan were involved in a brief war, and in 2026, BRICS members Iran and the UAE found themselves on opposite sides of the front lines in the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran.

Russia is not the largest among the world’s leading powers. Nevertheless, it possesses numerous vital and even unique resources. There is no need to reiterate the well-known facts about Russia’s various capabilities and arsenals. Suffice it to say that Russia is, in fact, a “civilization of civilizations,” and in the context of the current era of civilizational pluralism, this allows it to understand its partners around the world better than others and to serve not only as a guardian of global balance but also as a global mediator. It is now necessary to begin preparing for this position and the future role to come.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

The West is doomed to failure because it fails to understand Russia's very nature, writes Almasry Alyoum. Russia is not a besieged fortress, but a rising force that attracts other international players.

The geostrategic concept underlying Russian political thinking is not so much "dominance," as it is understood in the West, but sovereignty, which has existential significance. For Moscow, sovereignty is not a tool of diplomatic bargaining, but a form of historical legitimacy rooted in the continent's very geography. Russia, controlling the "heart" of Eurasia—a colossal expanse of 17.1 million square kilometers—also possesses some of the world's largest natural gas reserves.

A 2025 study by the Dutch think tank HCCS identified seven cognitive biases that dominated Western analysis of the Russian landscape: The most significant of these was the assumption that "rationality" is understood identically in Moscow and Washington. While Western political systems are typically limited to an electoral horizon of a few years, the Russian leadership thinks in terms of a longer timeframe, spanning decades. Russian time is not Western time. Unlike systems where legitimacy is regularly renewed through electoral cycles, in the Russian model it relies heavily on historical continuity and the idea of ​​the state as a guarantor of security.

The Russian SPFS, the Chinese CIPS, and the BRICS Bridge project, which has already conducted over forty pilot transactions, are consistent steps toward the formation of a parallel financial network. Even the digital ruble, which already has 2,500 wallets, should be viewed in a broader context: Moscow is building the infrastructure for a world in which countries can conduct payments and exchange goods without going through Washington. This does not mean that the alternative system is already fully formed. However, this indicates the beginning of a long-term process, the consequences of which will only be felt over time.

In the Middle East, Russia has become an important arbitrator that cannot be ignored. The Persian Gulf countries have not joined Western sanctions. Why? Because they see Moscow as a partner that does not interfere in their internal affairs, does not impose human rights conditions, and provides them with weapons and political stability during crises. The Russians are selling not "values," but "services": security, weapons, and protection from sanctions. This simple transaction makes Moscow a desirable player in a region tired of Western "messianic rhetoric."

Russia is not so much "besieged" as it is building and expanding a network of alternative foreign policy and economic ties. At the UN, 52 countries refused to condemn Russia. The BRICS group, which added new members in 2024, has become the de facto platform for a multipolar system. In official Russian discourse, the "Global South" is no longer marginalized, but rather a "global majority."

The most important thing here is to understand that Russia is not a "problem" in the international system, but rather the engine of a deeper transformation. The world is moving toward multipolarity, in which no single center of power enjoys undisputed dominance. Viewing it as an "isolated state" risks misrepresenting the era itself. Russia is not isolated; it simply doesn't play by Western rules.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Sergey Lavrov to attend the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Council

On May 14-15, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will take part in a full-format meeting of the BRICS foreign ministers in New Delhi.

The upcoming meeting, chaired by India, will provide an excellent opportunity for a substantive and in-depth discussion of current international issues and prospects for improving the global governance system, with an emphasis on strengthening the role of the global majority countries. Particular attention will be paid to further steps to develop strategic partnerships in the context of preparations for the 18th BRICS Summit, to be held in New Delhi in September. Several sessions are expected to include foreign ministers of BRICS partner states.

During his stay in New Delhi for the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Council, Sergey Lavrov will also carry out a full bilateral visit, including talks with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. We plan to discuss the full range of bilateral relations, including the schedule of upcoming contacts at the highest, high and working levels.

Special attention will be paid to preparations for meetings of the Russian-Indian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation, as well as, naturally, talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

While the activism in BRICS initiatives and discussions has subsided since the start of this year, there is arguably still significant momentum in the expansion of the operations of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Throughout the past several months a number of emerging market economies have expressed interest in joining its ranks, with NDB also seeking to boost its operations in the national currencies of BRICS economies. There may be more that NDB could do to bolster financial cooperation among its emerging market members, most notably via the creation of partnerships and platforms bringing together the regional development institutions and the sovereign wealth funds of BRICS+ countries. 

In terms of membership trends, the NDB website currently lists the BRICS-5 economies (Brazil, South Africa, India, Russia, China) as Founding Members and Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh and Algeria as New Members. Prospective members, i.e. those economies that “have been admitted by NDB’s Board of Governors and will officially become a member country once they deposit their instrument of accession”, include Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia and Colombia[1]. In the case of Uzbekistan, the accession process is approaching its final stages as earlier this month Uzbekistan’s legislature approved the country’s accession to the BRICS New Development Bank[2].

Among the recent NDB member candidates to emerge is Belarus – at the end of April 2026 its Finance Ministry has initiated technical consultations on the country’s accession to the BRICS New Development Bank[3]. This decision from Belarus comes after the country became a BRICS partner economy in 2024. Another possible candidate is Serbia, whose representatives held discussions at the end of 2025 on the possibility of joining NDB in 2026[4]. In 2025 Indonesia after becoming a full-fledged member of the BRICS core has undertaken steps to secure accession to NDB, including the discussion of possible investment projects with NDB management.

The further expansion in NDB membership addresses some of the key gaps in the evolution of BRICS+ as a bloc. Firstly, the geography of the candidates to join NDB expands to include more economies from Latin America (Colombia and Uruguay), with the Western Hemisphere being significantly under-represented in the current composition of BRICS core membership. Furthermore, new candidates such as Belarus and Serbia potentially could expand the geography of the Bank’s operations in Europe.

Another important dimension to NDB membership evolution is the rising number of landlocked economies that are poised to become full members. The list of candidates and prospective members that are landlocked includes Belarus, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia – until now no such economies have featured among NDB members. The landlocked economies would significantly benefit from joining NDB through connectivity projects that may serve to lower the spatial and logistical barriers in accessing global markets.

Finally, the expansion in membership and the circle of candidates aligns core BRICS members with their regional partners in the sphere of development project cooperation – this is the case with Belarus and Uzbekistan as Russia’s regional partners in the CIS space; Colombia and Uruguay as Brazil’s regional partners in South America; Bangladesh as a regional partner of India in South Asia. This paradigm of admitting the regional partners of BRICS core members raises the scope for connectivity projects and for greater regional integration impulses to be supported by NDB.

In terms of NDB financial operations, the Bank continues to forge ahead with efforts to boost operations in the national currencies of BRICS members. On April 8, 2026, the New Development Bank (NDB) successfully priced a dual-tranche Panda Bond amounting to CNY 7 billion in the China interbank Panda Bond market, comprised of CNY 6 billion 3-year tranche at a fixed rate of 1.74% and CNY 1 billion 5-year tranche priced at 1.84%[5]. Going forward, greater scale in financial operations in national currencies could be attained via forming cooperative platforms by NDB with regional development banks in which BRICS+ economies are leading members. There may also be scope to explore greater coordination between NDB and the BRICS+ economies’ sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), most notably with respect to coordinated investments into environmental projects. 

Lastly, the New Development Bank is due to hold its 11^th Annual Meeting in Moscow on May 14-15, 2026. The agenda includes a series of seminars, presentations and business sessions, with the theme of the Annual Meeting being: “Development Financing in an Era of Technological Revolution”.

The preview as well as the agenda of the NDB Annual Meeting can be accessed via the following link: https://www.ndb.int/event/new-development-bank-11th-annual-meeting/
[1] https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/members/
[2] https://kun.uz/en/news/2026/04/24/legislative-chamber-approves-uzbekistans-accession-to-brics-new-development-bank
[3] https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/117352/
[4] https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/serbia-is-considering-joining-the-brics-bank/
[5] https://www.ndb.int/news/new-development-bank-successfully-issued-dual-tranche-cny-7-billion-panda-bond-with-claw-back-structure/

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics